Posted by
Rennaissance Man on Sunday, January 20, 2008 10:05:04 AM
Instinctive versus Consensual Decision-making: Is there enough time and too much information? A new look at some old questions
A complicated subject such as quick decision-making tied to leadership traits will require a three-part approach. One must understand that social scientists have not kept abreast of physical science daily advances, which often reveal more new questions than resolution of old questions. To many, this indicates the need for a multi-faceted new approach to heuristics within the leadership and decision-making current knowledge. To go forward we need new templates/models and research methodology to help answer the questions actual operational leaders might need within their 21st century organizations. Let us approach this in a three-stage manner addressing first the decision-making models and current literature and their unavoidable relationship to modern leadership theory. This also entails more current research mixed methodology, which for the lack of a better term we will call “heuristic realism”. Perhaps as some would suggest, we are tiptoeing around the idea that our answers lie in past practices that many would consider archaic or even evil such as educated and experienced instinctive decision-making.
WHY DO WE CARE?...
In leadership decision-making, some observers argue that time limits in the real world often prevent decision makers from becoming more innovative as it takes more resource energy to innovate than to keep a steady course.
Many researchers do realize and would like others to recognize that accurate and speedy crisis decision making can be a competitive advantage, which does lead to future innovation. Julian Simon in his 1981 classic, The Ultimate Resource, wrote about how scarcity leads to innovation. This means that even “time” is a valuable resource in decision-making affects innovational ability and creativity. Could this also include leadership as a valuable resource since it’s’ scarcity causes innovation by allowing great leaders to rise to the occasion? It takes more corporate resource to innovate rather than “staying the course” in rough times. This most likely occurs because in highly volatile strategic decision-making and leadership situations.
The temptation to work hard to stay afloat rather than experiment is dominant and many times doomed to failure as Peter Nutt discovered in 1999. He found that 50% of strategic decisions in his sample failed. This ultimately robs organizations of innovative and pioneering competitive advantage and causes American business to play the game of “catch up” all too often.
During examinations to determine managerial effectiveness, it can be argued that the managers’ leadership style directly affects the quality and style of decision making within the organization. Decisions in organizations, even down to the family unit level, are tied to the leadership style and approach of particular leaders’ decision-making process and intelligence. This belief also supports decision making in team and group concepts that have become popular today, as the leader must still have a hand in guiding the team.
This invariably makes researchers argue that the SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis with its’ associated risk analysis should be a continuous process depending primarily upon the strategic decisions within the organization. SWOT becomes more critical within this information age where strategic information constantly floods daily consciousness to the point of overload. Risk analysis of the strategic decision making process would lead many to believe that most correct decisions are those that are deliberated within the area of unbounded rationality. Unbounded rationality takes into account all available information and explores all alternatives and criteria. According to Paul Nutt (1999), this is not the case. He studied 163 strategic decisions and concluded that approximately fifty percent of those studied strategic decisions failed. Accordingly this rate was even worse according to Kasanen (et-all 2000) for multi-criteria decisions.
How could this be? Could this be that within current decision-making, leadership models researchers are too intent on applying formulas, and techniques rather than letting the unbounded rationality of the mind do what it needs to do? Are academics thinking too much? Could decision-makers be processing useless information instead of gleaning for vital information? Are decision makers taking too long in this fast-paced age to deliberate and process information prior to making a decision and letting opportunities pass?
Many executives lament the group decision-making process to the point of despair stating that they do not have the time luxury of such a risk. This takes too much time for crucial decisions today. By the time decisions are made, new circumstances are constantly surfacing and new factors to consider arise, which make the original problem completely different and any previous decisions obsolete. The adage that “time is money” and that everyone lives in a competitive world applies aptly to the current situation. As Peter Todd (2005) states, if decision-makers do not speed up the pace of strategic decision-making, the “less likely we are to out-compete our rivals in the endless arms race of life”. Scholars then in turn lament the fact that many practitioners ignore serious research designed to make their lives more profitable; but are researchers catering to practitioners, or to themselves by ignoring realities?
“A manager should work on integrating his formal models of rational decision making with his intuitive judgmental, common sense manner of solving choice problems and seek to adapt the former to fit the latter rather than submit to a bastardization of his intuition in the name of some modern mathematical technique.” (Soelberg, 1967)
In too many cases in strategic decisions, there is too much information for even a team to process in risk analysis during the SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat) analysis process (Kumar, et-al 2001) and much of that information was superfluous causing the decision makers to ponder useless information rather than vital information. This long, drawn out decision process and lack of urgency caused many to miss opportunities and make ultimate decisions faulty since the original problem or situation had changed in nature as time progressed as many crises do. Cause and effect showed that time ignored and passed up the decision makers until they weren’t even looking at a problem as it really existed anymore but only as it appeared when it first reared itself. This made their deliberations out of date and useless and in some cases even dangerous.
Time management has always been a thoroughly tough and persistent topic among business managers throughout all industries and there has always been no lack of advice and suggestions from various individuals ready to make a quick consulting buck at the expense of the harried executive from Blanchard’s groundbreaking “One Minute Manager” (1986) to present day.
The use of the term “time management” is especially troubling and indicates how wrong individuals can be, because what most fail to understand is that it is not time itself that decision-makers manage but themselves. Once this myth is overcome, decision-makers can actually master their behavior within time constraints for decision making in corporate and even daily lives. Organizations are at the mercy of time and it is the ultimate master. Executives must accept that subservient position and work within well-defined limits as variables instead of constants in the equation. All individuals and organizations are products of time itself from the earliest days in Oldavai Gorge in Africa to the more current nine-month gestation that brought everyone into the world. How can individuals not understand the obvious, that they are the only variable in any research equation? When researchers realize this and understand that they must manage themselves within the limited constraints allowed and not time itself, then they will be less frustrated in daily decisions much less during crisis decisions that affect others.
ARCHAIC RESEARCH DESIGNS?
The field of organizational change and innovation thru strategic decisions is far from mature in understanding dynamics and effects of time, process, discontinuity and context. As Pettigrew (et-al 2001) states; “generalizations are hard to sustain over time, and they are even tougher to uphold across international institutional and cultural borders. Dynamism has been difficult to study and social science has developed quite comfortably as an exercise in comparative statistics”. To social researchers the meaning is simple; they are cheating themselves out of accurate research through complacency with current methods. They use those methods because they are deemed comfortable. They have not accepted the dual challenge to scholars:
“(1) to attempt to catch reality in flight and
(2) To study long term processes in their contexts in order to elevate embedded ness to a principle of method” (Pettigrew et-al 2001).
Prior this century, empirical studies of organizational change for a unit of analysis were a change event or an episode isolated from other functions and variables. This study proposes using “contextualize” as a theory of method for refining studies such as the great analytical but inconclusive “two dimensional” groundwork of Hambrick (1984) and other researchers. Through the use of contextualism, we will be able to make such choices such as specifying the number of levels of analysis to include within the treatment of context as well as the understanding that there is most likely more related processes underway acting as variables to the model at those different levels at the same time. All of these are determining the primary change process, which we will be investigating, and therefore all warrant a closer look.
ASSUMPTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
What assumptions can anyone make so far that may prompt further research? These assumptions should and are basically designed to challenge others in this area of research.
(H1)It is primarily assumed that models with many contextual levels and simultaneous processes cannot be exactly reproduced in a researchers’ laboratory through analytical statistical data due to the lack of time spatial context on those processes. (Ancona, et-all 2001) (Perlow, et-all 2002) (Mitchel et-al 2001)
(H2)It is further assumed that previous studies on leadership decision making processes ignored the most pressing variable in their research, that of available time and time management during the process. (Ancona, et-al 2001).
(H3)Time pressures can both prevent and enhance innovative thinking in the strategic decision-making process depending upon the character of the players such as TMT or the CEO and their diversity. (Hambrick 1981, 1984); (Gersick 1988); (Barkema et al 2002)
-“Prevent” through the lack of thorough and frequent scanning of the environment by TMT due to time constraints in volatile situations or environments when many levels and many processes are occurring simultaneously. Lack of a pro-active decision-making. (Nutt, 2000); (Hambrick, 1984); (Beal 2000); (Sawyer et-all 2000).
-“Enhance” through the involuntary last minute inclusion of the CEO who would usually not involve him/herself in day-to-day scanning or decision-making. Strangely enough, this also involves lack of pro-active decision-making. (Sawyer et-all 2000). Time also enhances decisions through the sense of urgency, which would enable an experienced crisis decision maker to be able to discard volumes of useless information (criteria), and alternatives and concentrate on the most useful and viable only. (Todd 2005)
(H4) Pro-active decision making vice “reactive” decision-making enhances innovation in strategic decision-making. (Schwenk 1995)
(H5) More time and more information for deliberation does not inherently translate to a more satisfactory decision and in fact may work against this objective. (Nutt 1999)
(H6) Time is an inescapable ultimate resource, whose scarcity contributes to the lack of innovation. (Simon 1985)
(H7)Lack of speedy decision making in a fast and ever-changing environment can lead to lack of satisfactory decisions and innovation, which can seriously degrade corporate competitive advantage as time, has become a factor in strategic competitive advantage.
(H8)Charismatic leadership is not a style of leadership but merely a trait of leadership such as good or bad ethics that may be found in almost any form of leadership style. Too often, we associate charismatic individuals with the transformational style when in fact in the Leader-Follower Exchange theory the charismatic trait has been successfully used in the past by despots and unscrupulous leaders with hidden agendas. They have managed to entice the following of even a small but vocal, active fringe of the general populace to share their aims and goals.
(H9) With discoveries of more and more human traits and intangible behaviors and mental illness such as Alzeimers' being found as inherited traits or problems, is it not fair to assume that some leadership traits and decision-making instincts for either self-preservation or species survival might also be inherited?
With these assumptions in mind, scholars should see decision-making models that represent the speediest and most accurate method in this fast-paced world. Are they ignoring instinct in crisis management?
SUBCONSCIOUS AND INSTINCT
One might add another factor here in studying the validity of instinctive versus deliberative decision making in crisis situations. That factor might be explained in the behavior of babies who research psychologists have noted losing their initial instincts when the begin learning to sit, crawl or walk. In other words, they were doing just fine with instinct and their instincts were stronger before the actual learning process of understanding balance and limitations/obstacles to the process they were attempting to perform. To many, including those in hiring responsible positions, the more educated an individual is the less common sense (call it instinct!) they possess and therefore less likely to be successful in unpredictable circumstances such as a crisis management situation. With advances in the physical sciences we are learning that many human behaviors and traits can be inherited. Does this mean that instinctive predispositions to decision-making and various leadership traits are also inherited talents, which must be nurtured and used to work properly? Could scientists be intent on finding the similarity in animal instinctive behavior with human behavior including decisions regarding self-preservation or the preservation of humans as a species? Are we born with a species communal instinctive knowledge for self-survival and species survival as many other creatures are?
In this modern world, more and more decisions can and are regarded as crisis decisions so this should be a subject to be explored properly. Klein (1989) set the stage for this type of research to determine why certain individuals and leaders are able to process information that deliberative decision makers do in split seconds of time depending upon the contingency and experience (Fiedler 1995) with his Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT). Keeny (1992) in identifying how criteria or suitable alternatives which he called Value Focused Thinking (VFT) and Alternative Focused Thinking (AFT) too this further but it was Nutt (1993) who suggested that these factors in the problem structuring phase occurred simultaneously.
Nutt went on further to state that decision-makers “reframe” a problem or situation to one that is more recognizable to us and more familiar based upon our past experiences and that once a suitable alternative decision that fits past experience is found they stop the process and take the first good “fit”. This would seem to fit Simons’ “satisficing” theory well but these theories within the descriptive model of decision making only focus on various phases such as “problem structuring” of the instant decision making process instead of the entire process (Corner et-all 2001). This brings one to question why are social scientists studying the structure of a problem when that particular problem has immediately been presented to decision-makers structured and ready for action. Does a decision-maker necessarily have to break down the problem into its’ component parts to understand the urgency of a decision?
Other authors have only concentrated on the very last phase of the decision making process called the “choice” phase where the alternative is selected (Mintzberg 1976; Einhorn, 1970 and Tversky 1972). All concentrated on humankind’s’ “limits” or “bounded rationality” proposed by Simon and ignored the subconscious minds’ innate ability to help us survive in a fight or flight situation.
The closest researcher within bounded rationality who inclusively adds time as a heuristic would be Peter Todd (2005). His views on “ecological rationality” include a more open system model of making decisions by opening up the decision maker to other information such as subconscious decision processes based upon the environment as a holistic unit or in its’ entirety. He challenges researchers to discard the perception that to do anything less than the traditional in decision-making is to expect only perfection and dooms them to error and poor judgment by over thinking a problem.
The main feature of this theory is that individuals are irrational and cannot conceivably process all the information available and many decision-makers waste valuable time by attempting to process more information than needed for the situation at hand.
In his “fast and frugal heuristics”, he encourages tricks to ignore the unnecessary and only search for the few bits of most helpful information. This appears to resemble a “contingency model” in appearance in that each problem or decision to be made is only applicable to certain environments we find ourselves in such as home, work, pleasure and that through experience we are “tuned” already to those environments. Further he states that “our minds are designed to work in environments where information is often costly and difficult to obtain” which would lead many to adopt these short cuts such as his “fast and frugal heuristics” and ignore most superfluous information available by relying on important “cues”. Agreement can be found in Simons’ “satisficing”. Simon believes individuals make choices that are “accurate in their appropriate applicability, domains achieving ecological rationality through their fit to particular information structures”. Once again, individuals are “satisficing” by finding a fit to that particular contingency in our experiences. Peter Todd goes on to state that “the world is competitive and our decision mechanisms must be fast…less likely we are to out-compete our rivals in the endless arms race of life”. This statement alone should be impetus enough for other researchers to ponder future research.
Researchers should study subconscious decision-making and instinct. They must include it in any study of actual deliberated decisions, which are out of reach of social scientists and researchers. Time itself is proving that conscious and subconscious alike are simultaneously processing the information we require for our most critical decisions at lightning speed. Most academics and researchers have basically forgotten that an autocratic style of decision making on the fly is still prevalent within the entrepreneur and sole proprietorship ranks of management and have discounted its’ historical basic ability to respond quickly and most often correctly in many crisis decision events. The current belief is that snap decisions are autocratic in style and therefore “evil” and wrong since they do not always seek to form a consensus that some may or may not have the luxury of time. Followers within the leader-follower matrix have often allowed and treasured those who are decisive and operate from what instinct allows them to see what is right and what is wrong throughout history. Could experienced and successful crisis managers and leaders be using an inherited predisposition to instinctive decision-making influenced by inherited traits for self-survival. In the case for heroes who automatically process information spontaneously to save comrades who have families versus their own self-preservation and safety be victims of an overriding inherited predisposition in their decision-making toward species survival vice their own.
Followers in the leader follower matrix have allowed and treasured those who are decisive and instinctively make moral judgments during crisis? This has been the case with many wartime leaders throughout world and US history. Examples would include strong leaders such as Grant, Lincoln, Patton, Truman, and Churchill just to name a few. serve to show us how in the leader/follower matrix, their efforts after a crisis has passed they are soon forgotten. It would seem there is a temporary leader follower contract during a crisis. The minute the crisis is past; the followers then demand the removal of the leader reminiscent of a mob of villagers during a scene from Frankenstein.
It is amazing to note that the detractors from this style of leadership remained mute during the crisis as they do not want to be in that particular situation themselves and are content with someone more capable at the reigns during a crisis. Could these opponents of great leaders in crisis somehow lack the self-confidence to tackle the problem at hand themselves? These charismatic and decisive leaders were great because they were able to overcome the bounds of conscious limitations or Simons’ bounded rationality. Historical leaders drew upon their subconscious minds to make those correct decisions. Perhaps they were able to articulate the visions that followers struggle with but cannot describe because the conscious and subconscious minds are out of touch with each other.
Finally, these leaders were not all autocrats, benevolent dictators nor transformational leaders although they all had a certain charismatic flair. Perhaps part of their charismatic leadership trait (notice not equated to a “style”) even though they often made autocratic and arbitrary decisions when they had to, might be the fact that followers were envious of them and their ability and confidence to face decisions others would not wish upon themselves.
Referenced studies attempt to peel back the layers of sub-conscious decision making which has been shown in clinical studies to actually perform better in crisis situations even when the individual does have extensive experience to rely upon since the mind can basically rehearse probable courses of action prior to a crisis decisions. The speed at which this occurs cannot be measured except in nano-seconds. Take the simple case study of various hero situations where an individual has decided in a split second the various probability outcomes and still reacted by throwing his/herself on a hand grenade. A recent incident in Iraq involved a soldier who knowingly threw himself on a grenade fully knowing he was the only single person while his comrades were all married family men. How long did he have to make that distinction with the instinctive reaction? Everyone has heard of the stranger who recently jumped on and shielded a stranger on the New York subway tracks. This person in seconds assessed how they could both survive if executed properly and did not have time to second-guess him. He knew exactly what he was doing when he allowed the train to pass over both of them.
What decision process goes on in the mind of a person who rushes to pick up a child directly in the path of a speeding car? Only the persons performing such unselfish actions can determine whether it was the “correct” snap decision to be made. When these individuals read about previous accounts that were similar, did they subconsciously rehearse what they would do in a similar situation? Could this be a manifestation of inherited species common knowledge for survival in fight or flight situations within the decision-making process? It would appear that in such situations the species survival seems stronger than the individual self-preservation instinct or could that particular strength be an inherited quality?
Could the explanation also be that many subconsciously rehearse what they would do during a crisis? This is a form of weighing alternatives for possible future events. The self-confident individual might have already determined his/her course of action prior to a crisis by daydreaming, wondering what they would do in similar situations. Crisis heroes eventually decide on their own fate well in advance. When individuals read about previous accounts of heroic action, whether in combat or in daily crises, perhaps the subconscious is already making decisions and rehearsing. Do individuals envision the ability to make the right decision prior to actually facing it and already start envisioning scenarios for success? Do individuals subconsciously daydream or rehearse what one would do in similar situations if faced with such a decision? Could this rehearsal be a form of considering alternatives?
Clinical evidence is recently telling us that this process is exactly the same bounded rationality that takes place in the boardroom or while performing personal decisions except at lightning fast compressed speeds. Those particular steps include:
- Assembling all available information (strategic scanning and intelligence gathering)
- Processing and evaluating information as well as discarding more useless info.
- Decisions are predetermined probability outcomes of different courses of action. This is a form of “rehearsal”.
- Decision makers must determine how much time before a decision must be made. May the decision be deferred without harm?
- Certainty or confidence level of the proposed decision.
- Finally…the decision and action
NEW CONSCIOUS AND SUBCONSCIOUS DIAGRAMS
Consider model diagrams (figures 1-1 and 1-2) which illustrate the differences we
propose to illustrate various points made by many social and physical researchers today. Consider these an amalgamation of many theories and models.
PHYSICAL SCIENCES ARE AHEAD OF US
Between conscious deliberation and our instinctive decision-making process, which is more prone to, decisions that boil down to survival of ourselves as a species if we apply the historic species memory concept that some physical scientists are considering.
As social scientists, it is imperative that researchers do not ignore breakthroughs in physical sciences. Rodolfo Llimas at the National Science Foundation(2005); Grigori Enikolopov; Mirjana Maletic-Savatic and Jeff Litchman (2007) of the National Institute of Health have made significant human behavior breakthroughs through biology and genetics that should be incorporated into research by social scientists. This research, as well as that of other clinical and physical scientists, adds to the total knowledge of decision-making and leadership. Breakthroughs include the possibility that personality traits and disorders may be inherited through genetics.
To social researchers, physical science breakthroughs mean new answers are being found. Unfortunately, for researchers, this also opens up more new questions than answers to pursue and refine including some based upon old themes. If an individual can inherit the ability to lose memory can that also mean there is an inherited or “collective memory” comprised of group instinctive memories? This is similar to that which many animals possess (including humans) when they are born? Might the fight or flight instinctive decision then be considered hard-wired and natural? If an individual can inherit traits and behaviors, then by definition could it then be possible for a descendant of one or two great leaders to inherit great leadership potential including the decision-making process? If this theory proves valid in the physical science realm, would this cause social scientists to revisit the discarded theory that great leaders are born, not made?
Klein (1988) has long been considered an expert on the decision making process and brings forth many substantial arguments for trusting the subconscious decision making process and draws many parallels to both the conscious level and subconscious level (intuition/instinct) process. He believes many are already “hard wired” in our subconscious memories toward instinctive decisions that turn out to be more than “satisficing” (Simon 1976, 1979). He also draws comparisons to the bounded rationality used during conscious decision-making efforts to processes actually being used in instinctive processes within the sub-conscious.
Klein’s’ basic work has led some modern psychological researchers that have investigated first responders such as firefighters who Klein had an interest in to determine why they perform various dangerous actions in spite of those dangers to themselves. Jonathan Schooler (et-all 1993) suggests that most individuals constantly overlook the capabilities of their own intuition in the decision making process when they stop and take time to verbalize and rationalize decisions. Within the mind in the subconscious level, words are processed as total thoughts at lightning speed and decisions become incredibly accurate compared to conscious deliberations. Verbalization actually interferes with this process and distracts individuals from making a timely decision.
Other researchers include Timothy Wilson (2003) who uses many case studies to show the power of the subconscious mind versus the conscious decision making process. Through these case studies, he consistently presents the case that intuitive or subconscious decisions are usually more reliable and trustworthy. Two separate case studies are relevant to this study. Both the New York Subway hero story in the news and the latest soldier in Iraq to throw himself on a grenade to sacrifice his comrades are compelling case studies drawing attention to how lightning fast the subconscious instinctual reasoning process is. Both these cases show the power of subconscious reasoning versus conscious rationality. These cases should adequately cause researchers to question whether instinctive decisions subconsciously arrived at are inherently evil or merely a natural and primal process of survival of the species (fight or flight syndrome?)
CRISIS DECISIONS
It has been argued by many with actual field experience that only rarely will a crisis manager be confronted with merely one symptom/problem at a time. The fight or flight syndrome also applies to ordinary individuals who for whatever reason find themselves often in a quandary when attempting to make a vital life decisions. These situations include individuals with all the time in the world to make such decisions versus situations where there is no time for deep thought and consideration but where one must depend upon “instinctive” reactions.
Social scientists also believe that different senses and variables work on the individuals’ confidence regarding a decision reached instinctively versus those where they must build a consensus and are therefore more concerned about how others might perceive their decisions. This is the primary basis for decision making ….the ability to discard extraneous data (others opinions?). This has to be balanced against whether individuals see their decisions as right or wrong decisions or merely “satisficing”. “Satisficing” is a word made popular by Simon to illustrate those who made decisions that will “do for now” albeit delaying a future more permanent decision.
What type of individual, leader or hero should be the subject of these future studies? As discussed earlier, all types of leaders have been able to take up the mantle of crisis leader and make autocratic decisions when needed. It can be safety assumed that situational or contingency leaders in the past have had to deal with jealousy and distrust from others but then reached inside for their emotional intelligence and strong self-confidence to keep from becoming dark leaders. Once in the dark or selfish mode a leader is not able to revert to another style of leadership once the crisis fires are extinguished.
Crisis decision-making therefore, can be any style of leader although most appear to be charismatic. One should not confuse charisma as a leadership “style” as many leaders that were transactional, transformational, or even “dark” have shown charisma in the past. What really separates the great charismatic crisis manager is emotional intelligence to go with their leadership style and the ability to know when it is appropriate to take the helm versus delegating or seeking consensus with an uncanny sense of visionary timing. This attribute makes emotional intelligence so vital in this leader.
Could this be a new leader of the 21st century or are researchers rediscovering and updating of some old leadership types that have served human beings well during past crises. An evolved leader… perhaps, since everyone is still evolving.
This could be any current leader or manager. They could be rehearsing scenarios within their minds daydreaming about what they would do in particular situation to solve problems and become the hero of the day. If someone has the emotional intelligence to overcome or use their own failings, perhaps the next great leader is putting his/herself in the example case study situations right now and rehearsing what they would do if placed in those same situations.
Finally, it is appropriate to quote Saunders (2004) who said:
“The cost of time. Perhaps the value of time is so underrated because it seems to be free. However, time is costly, and each minute can be invested only once. Successful executives have said that once they understood time as a critical, primary resource, they began making their most valuable contributions to the company. This includes developing strategies, looking outward, and understanding customers – in short, planning for growth!”
Crisis leaders who know the value of “instinctive” decisions are desperately needed. Especially needed are crisis leaders and researchers who understand the value of time constraints in daily decisions or crisis decisions. With proper emotional intelligence, any leader has been and can in the future be an effective crisis decision- maker.
HEURISTIC REALISM AS A NEW RESEARCH MODEL
That brings up a very clear question on how researchers in this century can proceed forward without attempting to evolve research methodology into a more inclusive template and framework that allows one to study a motion picture of the decision making process vice a mere snapshot in time. A deeper look into leadership and decision-making models from which we can build a future template is warranted.
Within the realm of social research, current evaluation of the present literature regarding the decision making process, researchers perceive the actual decision making process both in the bounded rational and deliberative decision making and the irrational subconscious decision making realms of human behavior. The biggest point of contention lies within the consensus seeking stage just prior to the actual action stage of making the decision. This is the deliberative state where groupthink and peer pressure as well as other human variables (failings) cause a decision-maker to waiver during a final decision.
It should be noted that the word “temporary” refers to the ability to find the first correct “fit” to a prior experience or through rehearsed daydreaming at which point the decision maker ceases looking for more alternatives (Simons’ “satisficing”). Some argue that individuals can and often do believe this is only a temporary solution to the problem faced and an ultimate decision must then be faced at a later point in time.
WE ARE ALL HEROES!
Some individuals believe that the fight or flight syndrome also applies to those who for whatever reason find themselves in a quandary when attempting to make a vital life decisions. Consider that even with all the time in the world to make such decisions; versus situations where there is no time for deep thought one must depend upon instinctive reactions. Researchers believe that different senses and variables work on the individuals’ confidence regarding a decision reached instinctively versus those where they must build a consensus. Some decision makers are more worried about how others perceive their decisions. This is the primary basis for decision making ….the ability to discard extraneous data (others opinions?) balanced against what one considers correct moral decision. Many consider satisficing as temporary in nature because the decision maker takes the first self-perceived fit when evaluating alternatives. These individuals settle for a less than perfect decision even though it may be the correct decision. When satisficing….decisions are ongoing and never finished.
THE CASE FOR PROPER LEADERSHIP IN DECISION-MAKING MODELS
Nahavandi (2003) draws comparisons with leadership styles that fit within what he calls the three major decision models: the normative theory, contingency theory and cognitive resources theory (CRT). Fiedler (1995) is responsible for both the contingency and CRT(Cognitive Resource Theory) models of decision-making. Some would include Descriptive models of decision making such as “recognition primed decisions” (Klein 1989), Image theory (Beach, Mitchell 1990) and Cohen’s’ (1976) “Garbage Can Model”. Contingency and normative models are the most common in use.
Contingency model advocates assume that the leaders’ style is preordained by traits the leader was born with and therefore difficult to change. In this model, the leadership style must be a good match to a situation to achieve any semblance of effectiveness. The contingency model also focuses on group decision making.
The normative model of decision-making makes the quality of the decision of prime importance as a criteria for leadership effectiveness and as such focuses somewhat on leadership style, but not necessarily on finding a match with leadership style and decision making. It assumes that decision-making methods are learnable.
Both the normative and contingency models have improved leadership training and development because they operate on well-defined variables and guidelines that leaders may use to improve leadership effectiveness. Both models accomplish this by matching the leaders’ style to the situation. As previously stated the only major difference is that the normative model depends on unlearned traits versus the contingency model believing these characteristics can be learned.
The CRT (Cognitive Resource Theory) method has been and is still undergoing testing but primarily depends upon the leaders’ intelligence and experience and their impact in leader and group performance after stress is added as a factor or variable. Fiedler (1995) defines this as “interpersonal conflict and concerns about performance”. This becomes dependent upon how the leaders’ intelligence will contribute to the group as a whole. The leader is expected to continue to guide the group especially in complex tasks.
There seems to be a strange paradox in that during times of high stress within the organization teams or groups seem to be enhanced by the leaders’ intelligence and the reverse seems to be also true. It would seem in low stress operations and crisis that the leaders’ dependence upon tried and true experiences and intelligence works against the group instead of using his/her intelligence, which would benefit the group or organization. As Fiedler suggests “intelligence and experience interfere with each other”. Many observers add another thought to Fielders’ theories. They argue that learning often interferes with experience as well as natural instinct. If this is not the case, why do babies learning to sit and walk cast aside their instincts when beginning to learn?
Particularly in crisis management situations, these phenomena are evident when organizations actively seek and look for leaders who have experienced familiar crisis before. This would seem very familiar to the cases mentioned above and answer partially the question of why wartime or crisis leaders are discarded after a crisis. They are sought and gratefully accepted during a crisis and allowed much leeway in, their leadership styles while the crisis is ongoing in the leader follower matrix.
Perhaps all these decision model theories when combined become another theory altogether. Within these models, we might find various fringe theories such as the Recognition Primed decisions model (Klein 1989); Image theory (Beach, Mitchell 1990) and the “Garbage can Model” (Cohen et-all 1976).
Within the total descriptive model area, the recognition of primed decision advocated by Klein is based upon mental simulations of the past and alternatives for the future, which would remind scholars of the rehearsals mentioned earlier. Within this model, the individual examines goals, cues, expectations and actions to gauge a current situation relative to past situations. This means that current decisions remind the decision maker or have some similarity to past decisions and outcomes.
The Image theory advanced by Beach and Mitchell, is the same as Klein’s’ recognition theory, except that the view is represented by images or criteria (about three total) from which to evaluate alternatives. When the decision maker finds an alternative that visually, “fits” his/her own image then it exceeds a threshold and is adopted without looking any further if the “fit” is appropriate. This would seem to follow Simon’s satisficing theory in that once a suitable alternative is found, no further searching is deemed appropriate.
Cohen’s (1976) Garbage Can Model would seem interesting, but it is only regarded as worthy of discussion as a “fad” within some academic circles. It states that all things are disorganized awaiting organizational decisions. To quote Cohen this involves “organized anarchies …characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation.” He used universities for his study, which seemed quite biased as if there was an axe to grind. Consider the explanation for this theory when he characterized universities in particular as “collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for work.” Corner (2001) limits his coverage of this model for many of the same reasons mentioned already.
Corner (2001) additionally delves into the descriptive decision making models deeply by advocating a dynamic interaction between criteria and alternatives and claims to bridge the prescriptive and descriptive views of decision problem solving especially in the multi criteria problem-solving sector.
There are a variety of views that work together to form the entirety of the descriptive model of decision making such as those who look at the whole process in its’ entirety as a single item such as Mintzberg (1970) and Nutt (1984) or those who concentrate on the “choice” phase only such as Einhorn (1970) or Tversky (1972). Nutt (1993, 2001) views the descriptive model as a way for an individual to formulate choices and states there are four ways to formulate a decision such as by issue, by the idea, through objective directed and finally to “reframe it. According to him, a problem or situation is reframed to one that is more recognizable to us and more familiar based upon our experiences. Reframing is seen as the least used by decision makers but the most successful since most solutions are processed early on in a problem but new norms and criteria merge which makes other alternatives more attractive to the decision maker.
Corner goes on to break down his Dynamic model which is descriptive in nature by noting that a decision maker can either focus on the criteria first (Keeney 1992) which would be Value Focused Thinking (VFT). This in turn, would lead to the creation of opportunities rather than the need to solve problems. These values and criteria formed out of experience with alternatives would suggest decision simulations as a way to discover hidden values and most likely subsequently more promising alternatives. Corner then contrasts this in his dynamic model with what he cites, as Alternative Focused Thinking (AFT) (Nutt 1993). He believes this model is more common since decision makers have ready made and fixed sets of alternatives, which are well defined. The concepts between alternatives and criteria remain are contrasted since alternatives are mostly objective in nature with concrete and explicit forms and usually what the decision maker is used to dealing with. Criteria based thinking is more subjective and abstract requiring more thought.
ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY- “FAST AND FRUGAL HEURISTICS”
Peter Todd (2003) adds another dimension to decision-making models with what he calls “ecological rationality”. He bases his arguments and theory on the fact that modern technology delivers more information to people at faster rates and we cannot possibly be expected to process all that superfluous information in the shorter periods allotted to us. This “fast and frugal heuristics” has some very simple assumptions and tricks. Our minds are designed to work in environments where information is often costly and difficult to obtain which leads us to adopt “fast and frugal heuristics” in decision-making. We must learn to ignore most available information and rely on a few important cues; which means the real trick here is to ignore the unnecessary information and scan/search for the few bits of meaningful information that is most helpful. Todd states that even in this fast environment “they make choices that are accurate in their appropriate application domains, achieving ecological rationality through their ‘fit’ to particular information structures”. While this seems to fit Simons’ satisficing very well, he goes on to state that this is achieved through four classes of simple heuristics that use limited information:
(1)“Recognition based heuristics” where we stop when we find something we recognize from past experience;
(2)“one-reason decision mechanics” where we limit our criteria to one particular desire; (An example would be locating the cheapest restaurant); “
(3)”multiple-cue elimination strategies” which is merely an extension of the “one-reason” cue where instead of looking for only the cheapest restaurant we would eliminate expensive and distant restaurants if we selected criteria of cheapest and closest restaurants”;
(4)” quick sequential search” which we apply to and are cued to specific environments such as; work, home etc.
The emphasis here is outside of the organization and self and into the “environment for bounding, constraining and empowering human cognition”. Todd’s’ goal is to “study how simple mental mechanisms can yield good decisions by exploiting the structure in the particular decision environment where they are used”.
The rational systems view would be considered part of the normative model of decision-making advanced by Weber and Thompson who saw decision making from the organizational viewpoint rather than as a characteristic of individuals within those organizations. In this view rational decisions lie within the structure of the organization itself through predetermined goals with maximum efficiency as the bottom line. This would refer not to the selection of that particular goal but its actual implementation, manner, and choices made to carry out the goal. There are many close fits with the normative model of decision-making.
Since Fiedler helped promote the Contingency and CRT (Cognitive Resource Theory) models it is no surprise that he is also attributed as one of the architects of the natural view of organizational rationality in that he considered the behaviors within the organization important especially those of the leader or decision makers in developing goals vice merely implementing them. Natural system proponents also point to the actual goal and seek to determine if the goal is real or merely a stated goal and want to be realistic with the goal rather than merely finding cost effective ways to attain the goal.
In the area of leadership in business management most of the literature and research since the mid-80s has used the analytical approach method desiring to match itself with the natural sciences as much as possible to lend legitimacy to the research. Social researchers attempt to accomplish this with cause and effect, studying the microelements rather than the system leadership is exercises in as a whole (macro). The tendency was and still is to study a small snapshot of the system, i.e. the manager, him or herself, without studying the environment (system) surrounding that manager and the quality of decision making.
Systems approach also is not totally appropriate for the study of leadership decisions, although it does improve the equation or the snapshot. This injects the decision into a context of environment or situation, which obviously would have an affect on the type of leadership and decision making style utilized.
Both systems until recently have ignored the fact that time is a crucial factor in any cause and effect (analytical) or system oriented methodology in research (system). The transition in this case can best be declared as the difference in research technology for business management that Mathew Brady and his still photo impressions compared to the advent of kinescope with Edison (moving pictures).
It might be noted, that both the rational and natural views perceive the organizations’ rationality as a thing or a unit and not a complex and loosely connected collection of individuals and subgroups with many heads and many centers for making decisions such as the open systems view. Some proponents believe that the organization viewed in this manner actually takes on a life of its’ own. Many who subscribe to the contingency model also subscribe to the open systems view. One can speculate that to differentiate itself from the other views the open systems view actually is closer to the CRT (Cognitive Resource Theory) as it might treat individuals and sub-units that act rationally as actual organizational resources and includes outside variables.
All of these systems deal with Simons’ original theories of bounded rationality and within the open system many mutations and combinations of all three views of organizational rationality have emerged with supporters and with critics and all with some merit.
THE FUTURE
Where do researchers go from here? It can be argued that very few researchers have taken a “holistic” or all-encompassing view of the split second decision-making process. This is the same process expanded in previous paragraphs which discussed investigations into “problem structuring” and the actual decision and its’ impact on self and others. What researchers need is a “total” vision of the split second human decision making process such as the ones outlined for conscious/deliberation and unconscious/instinctive thought? Todd’s’ (2005) view of “ecological rationality” could include mutations of all three systems. This is because it encompasses outside environmental factors that influence decision- making and that are important factors in risk analysis SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). It takes more of a real world and common sense approach to participants within an organization and the heuristics within the decision making process in its totality not merely in the “problem structuring phase” (Corner 2001). It encompasses more of the changes presently seen in organizations today. It provides a dynamic (Corner 2001) and moving rationality of human involvement rather than a static snapshot frozen in time.
Of all the theorists, Todd probably is the most realistic in his treatment of time within the decision making process as a constant process in time while participants and individual flawed human beings remain the variable. He can still see the great capacity of the human mind for its computing power and our ability to use common sense and instinct to our advantage to remain competitively viable in a changing world competitive environment.
Research needs to be accomplished within the heuristic decision making field building upon Todd’s’ initial conclusions as this might represent a more realistic picture within the open systems organizations.
Future models should contain elements of Corners’ (2001) AFT (Alternative Focused Thinking) and VFT (Value Focused Thinking) simultaneous view without dwelling on the problem-structuring phase. As one anonymous colleague stated “if a problem has presented itself to us and we must overcome it, what purpose does it serve for us to waste valuable time ‘structuring’ this problem?….it was presented to us already structured and has a head start on us!”.
Most of the authors studied subscribe to a “descriptive model” such as Klein’s’ which allows the decision maker to draw upon knowledge and the environment from all sources even from outside their own experiences and the organizations limitations. Since most today, do not believe that leadership is either trait (contingency) nor very learnable (normative) researchers must forge new directions even past Fielders’ CRT (Cognitive Response Theory) model, which allows both intelligence and experience to influence each other.
New models must be developed which consider time and realize the descriptive field where “recognition of primed decisions” comes into play. Modern social scientists must not and cannot divorce themselves from the physical science breakthroughs occurring daily. There must be interdisciplinary communication, as physical scientists can actually take motion pictures of the brain in color showing thought processes as they are happening in real time.
It is important that we pursue more inclusive models such as Todd’s’ “ecological rationality” which includes instinctive subconscious unbounded rationality with his “fast and frugal heuristics” view.
- To be successful, new and innovative methods must be explored. Laboratory simulations (which modern technology supports) uses past case studies to synthesize future methods of observation and data collection. Use of quantitative survey methods must be limited to finding proper sample populations and demographics for future qualitative surveys.
MODERN ADVANCES
- Social scientists can ill afford to ignore advances in the physical sciences regarding behavioral science. Current state of modern thinking in the physical sciences provides researchers with clinical laboratory data where observations the brain “perceiving” and “thinking” occurs. Color differential spectrums are now available called “Brainbows” by Jeffery Litchman and associates of Harvard University with grants from the National Institute of Health (2007). This provides a motion picture of the human thought process in real time.
HEURISTIC REALISM
- Information technology hardware and software provide a wealth of motion picture data through state of the art subjective laboratory and clinical experiences. These situational simulations are so realistic it is difficult to perceive from reality from fantasy. Technology exists which will produce qualitative laboratory simulations of a subjective and objective nature via the internet today. Dramatic breakthroughs are occurring with contemporaries across related disciplinary skills in the physical and clinical science world. Social scientist must learn to mix methodologies with those of related physical science disciplines. For future discussion an appropriate term for this cooperative methodology could be called “heuristic realism”. This “heuristic realism” would combine social science mixed methodology with physical science laboratory simulations.
- Unless a better social science methodology or approach is found to turn current snapshots into motion pictures; and these new approaches become acceptable and prove their validity to other social scientists, then case studies will remain useful. Researchers must never forget the past and its’ valuable experiences. Use of heuristic realism as a research method is undoubtedly one of the most valuable tools available as long as researchers understand current methodology does not satisfy all the data validity needs of all researchers involved in the field. The macro view of heuristic realism takes modern research one-step further in the continuing quest to find that one system that incorporates as many useful methodologies and approaches as possible. These combinations must appease all the data collection needs of research colleagues throughout the disciplines of study.
CONCLUSION
In future decision-making and leadership research, scholars and social scientists are needed who understand that individuals themselves are the variables without the ability to manage time but that the key lies actually in managing ourselves. Researchers should not arbitrarily discard successful leadership practices of the past even if they were only accepted during temporary crisis situations.
Experienced strategic managers and leaders should be relying more on their nurtured instincts for strategic decisions in today’s’ hyper-drive economic environment where the slow witted and uncertain perish. Researchers must understand this and provide valuable research that helps corporations with their strategic decision-making. Social research should not proceed without understanding advances in the physical sciences that assist that research such as the study of inherited human traits and instincts. Physical scientists on verge of great discoveries that impact the social science world greatly. Some of these discoveries will make many revisit such topics as leaders being made vice trained or nurtured and predispositions toward decision-making with inherited memory and instincts for either self-preservation or survival of the species. Without this understanding, there can be no actual marriage between scholarship and practitioner.
This is the future of research…that is to leave the limits of “bounded rationality” behind and begin to understand that humans are indeed “unbounded” creatures.
References
Ancona, D. G.; Goodman, P.S.; Lawrence, B.S.; & Tushman, M.L. (2001). Time, A new research lens. Academy of Management Review. 26(4). 645-664.
Ancona, D. G.; Okhuysen, G. A.; & Perlow, L.A. (2001) Taking time to integrate temporal research. Academy of Management Review. 26(4). 512-560.
Augustine, N.R. (1995) Managing the crisis you tried to prevent. Harvard Business Review. Nov/Dec 1995. 7(6). 137-158.
Barkema, H. G.; Baum, J.A.C.; & Mannix E.A. (2002) Management Challenges in a new time. Academy of Management Journal. 45(5). 291-295.
Beal, R. M. (2000) Competing effectively: Environmental scanning, competitive strategy and organizational performance in small manufacturing firms. Journal of Small Business Management. 38(1). 27-46.
Corner, J.; Buchanan, J.; & Henig, M. (2001). Dynamic decision problem structuring. Journal of Multicriteria Decision Analysis. May/Jun 2001. 10(3). 129.
Douglas, J.D. (1970) Understanding everydaylife. Chicago: Aldine 1970.
Einhorn, H.J. (1970) The use of nonlinear, noncompensatory models in decision-making. British Psychological Society Bulletin. 73(3). 221-270.
Enikolopov, G.; & Maletic-Savatic, M. (2007) Imaging neural progenitor cells in the living human brain. Science. November 9, 2007. Republished news release, NIH.
Fiedler, F. E. (1995) Cognitive Resources and leadership performance. Applied Psychology; An International Review. 44. 5-28.
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall.
Gigerenzer, G.; & Todd, P.M. (1999) Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox. In: Gigerenzer, G. & Todd, P.M.; The ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press, NY. 3-34.
Gigerenzer, G.; & Selton, R. (eds) (2001). Bounded Rationality: The adaptive toolbox. MIT Press. Cambridge MA.
Gordon, L.A.; Miller, D. M.; & Mintzberg, H. (1975) Normative models in managerial decision making. National Association of Accountants. New York.
Hertwig, R.; & Todd, P.M. (2003). More is not always better: The benefits of cognitive limits. In: Hardman, D.; & Macchi, L. (eds). Thinking: Psychological Perspectives on reasoning, judgment and decision-making. Wiley. Chiclesie. 213-231.
Ireland, R. D.; & Hitt, M. A. (2005) Achieving and maintaining strategic competitiveness in the 21st century: The role of strategic leadership. Academy of Management Executive. 19(4). 63-73.
Keeny, R. (1992) Value Focused Thinking. Harvard University Press. Harvard, MA.
Keller, L. R.; & Ho, J.L. (1988) Decision problem structuring generating options. In: IEEE Transacting on systems, man and cybernetics. 18(5). 715-729.
Klein, G. A. (1989) Recognition primed decisions. In: Advances in man-machine systems research, Rouse, W.B. (ed). JAI Press. Greenwich, CT. 47-92.
Kumar, K.; Subramanian, R.; & Strandholdm, K. (2001) Competeitive strategy, Environmental scanning, and performance: A context specific analysis of their relationship. Internal Journal of Commerce and Management. 11(1). 1-33.
Kumar, K.; & Thondikulan, G. (2003). Knowledge management in a collaborative business framework. Information Knowledge Systems mgmt. IOS Press. 5 (2005/2006).
Livet, J. W. (2007). A Brain of Many colors; Brainbows. Nature. November 1 2007.
Republished, NIH News Release.
Llinas, R. (2005) Wiring the brain at the nonoscale level. National Science Foundation.
July 7, 2005
Long, S. B.; Tao, X.; Campbell, E. B.; & MacKinnon, R. (2007) Atomic structure of a
Kv Channel in a lipid membrane-like environment. Nature, November 1, 2007.
Republished, NIH News Release.
March, J.G. (1988) The technology of foolishness. Civilakonomen, Copenhagen. 18. 1971. Reprinted in: Decisions and Organizations. Blackwell, Oxford.
Mintzberg, H.; Raisinghani, D.; & Theoret, A. (1976) The structure of unstructured decision processes. Administrative Science Quarterly. 21(2). 246-275.
Mitchel, T. R.; & James, L. R. (2001). Building better theory: Time and the specification of when things happen. Academy of Management Review. 26(4). 530-548.
Nisbett, R. E.; & Wilson T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know. Verbal reports on the mental processes. Psychological Review. 84*3). 231-259.
Nutt, P.C. (1984) Types of organizational decision processes. Administrative Science Quarterly. 29(3). 414-450.
Nutt, P. C. (1993). The formulation processes and tactics used in organizational decision making. Organization Science. 4(2). 240.
Nutt, P. C. (1998). Framing Strategic decisions. Organization Science. 9(2). 195-216.
Nutt, P. C. (1999) Surprising but true: Fifty percent of strategic decisions fail. Academy of Management Executive. 13(4). 75-90.
Nutt, P. C.; Backoff, R. W.; & Hogan, M. F. (2000). Managing paradoxes of strategic Change. Journal of Applied Management Studies. 9(1). 5-31.
Payne, J.W.; Bettundu, J.R.; & Johnson, E. J. (1993) The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge University Press, NY.
Perlow, L. A.; Okhuysen, G. A.; & Repenning, N. P. (2002) The speed trap: exploring the relationship between decision-making and temporal context. Academy of Management Journal. 45(5). 931-955.
Pettigrew. A. M.; Woodman, R. W.; & Cameron, K. S.. (2001) Studying organizational change and development: Challenges for future research. Academy of Management Journal. 44(4). 697-713.
Pfeffer, J. (2005) Producing sustainable competitive advantage through the effective management of people. Academy of Management Executive.19(4) 95-105
Piattell-Palmarini, M. (1996) Inevitable illusions: How mistakes of reason rule our minds. Wiley, New York.
Sawyer, O. O.; Ebrahimi, B. P.; & Tibodeaux, M.S. (2000) Executive environmental scanning, information source utilization, and firm performance: The case of Nigeria. Journal of Applied Management Studies. 9(1). 95-115.
Schooler, J. W.; Stellen, O.; & Brooks, K. (1993) Thoughts beyond words: When language overshadows insight”. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 122(2). 129-135.
Schwenk, C. R. (1995) Strategic decision making. Journal of Management. 21(3). 471-493.
Shank, M. E.; Zeithaml, C. P.; Blackburn, R. S.; & Boynton, A. C. (1988). Predictors of top management team environmental perception accuracy: A model and propositions. Academy of Management Proceedings. 37-41.
Simon, H.A. (1956) Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review. 63. 129-152.
Simon, H.A. (1955) A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 69. 99-118.
Simon, H.A. (1960). The new science of management decision. Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliff, NJ.
Simon, H.A. (1976) Administrative Behavior: a study of decision making processes in administrative organizations. 3rd ed. New York. The Free Press.
Simon, H. A. (1979) Rational decision making in business organizations. American Economic Review. 69(4). 493-513.
Simon, J. (1981) The Ultimate Resource. 10th Ed. Princeton Press.
Soelberg, P. (1967) Unprogrammed decision making. Industrial Management Review. 8(2). 19-29.
Struebing, L. (1996) Does your company invest your time wisely? Quality Progress. 29(12). 10.
Taket, A.; & White, L. (1997) Wanted: Dead or Alive –ways of using problem structuring in community OR. International Transactions in Operational Research. 4(2). 99-108.
Todd, P. M. (2005) How much information do we need. European Journal of Operational Research. 177. 1317-1332.
Tversky, A.; & Kahneman, D. (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science. 185. 1124-1131.
Von Winterfeldt, D. (1980) Structuring decision problems for decision analysis. Acta Psychologica. 45. 71-93.
Wilson, T. D. (2002) Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Ma.
Wright, G.; & Goodwin, P. (1999) Value elicitation for personal consequential decisions. Journal of Multi-criteria Decision Analysis. 8(1). 3-10.
Subconscious decision-making
(Figure 1-1)
Conscious decision-making (Figure 1-2)